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Abstract 
We propose a model of parental altruism in relation with child habit formation, where children 
are unaware of their developing habits while young, and become cognizant of them only on 
growing up. We show that an altruistic mother (i) maintains the amount of income transferred to 
her child lower than the child would desire and (ii) reduces further income transfer upon an 
exogenous increase in the child’s performance of a particular habit. The child, when grown, may 
end up grateful for the small income transfer if the mother is sufficiently rich and altruistic: 
when evaluated by the realized habitual preferences, a small income transfer leads to greater 
child welfare than the greater income transfer preferred by the child would have generated. This 
implies that parents from richer families, ceteris paribus, tend to guard against their children’s 
profligacy. 
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1. Introduction 
Parents discipline their young children by keeping income transfer (e.g., allowances) to the 
children lower than what the children themselves desire. This causes conflict between the 
parents, who do so from an altruistic motive, and the children, who believe that they will be 
better off with more money. When the children grow up, some come to understand that their 
parents had altruistic intentions and feel grateful; others remain resentful of their parent’s 
thriftiness. Why do altruistic parents not transfer as much income to their young children as the 
latter would like? Conversely, why do grown children not appreciate their parents' altruism? 
Although it is important to understand how parent-child interactions affect the 
consumption/saving behavior and related preference formation of the family members, 
economics has not yet examined these issues.  
To fill this knowledge gap, the present paper aims to address two questions: 
(i) Why do altruistic parents keep income transfers to young children lower than what the 
children desire?  
(ii) Whether, and under which conditions does the parents' behavior of restricting income 
transfers enhance the children's welfare and is, therefore, thankworthy? 
To do so, we consider an altruistic parent's behavior toward her habit-forming child (Becker, 
1974; Barro, 1974): the parent obtains utility from his or her own consumption, as well as the 
child's utility. In line with Weinberg (2001), and Bhatt and Ogaki (2012), the altruistic parent—a 
mother, for example—can determine the consumption level of her young child—a son, in this 
case—by controlling the amount of income transferred to him. A unique feature of our model is 
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that the child is habit-forming. By controlling income transfer to her young son, the mother in 
our model can influence his consumption habits, and hence, his future consumption behavior. 
We posit two key assumptions. First, as is the case of actual children, the young child is 
assumed to be unaware that consumption is habit-forming, whereas his mother is assumed to 
know this. The son thus tends to consume excessively. His altruistic mother has an incentive to 
keep her income transfer low, so as to restrict the son’s excess consumption. The model of 
misperceived habit formation is reasonable because the psychological literature provides 
empirical support for the importance of parental intervention in children's habits, in contexts as 
diverse as food consumption (e.g., Baumrind, 1991), passive leisure such as TV viewing (Walsh 
et al., 1998), and saving (Webley and Nyhus, 2006).
1
 Moreover, studies on the Easterlin 
paradox have provided empirical evidence of people experiencing welfare loss because they 
failed to incorporate the effects of habit formation (e.g., Easterlin, 1974). 
We also assume that, after reaching adulthood, the child becomes aware of the true 
mechanisms of habit formation. We are interested in how the grown-up child re-evaluates his 
mother's strict upbringing retrospectively, by using his realized habitual preferences. In 
particular, we regard the mother's income transfer to her young son as thankworthy from the 
(grown-up) son’s perspective if—when evaluated according to his true preferences—greater 
welfare was attained under the transfer than would have been attained under the greater income 
transfer that he sought in his youth.   
For problem (i), we show analytically that an altruistic parent keeps income transfers to his or 
                                            
1 However, there has been some controversy regarding the empirical validity of habit 
formation models (see, e.g., Dynan, 2000).  
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her child lower than he wants to give. Thus, our model describes a conflict between altruistic 
parents who raise their children strictly, and the children who complain about it. It is crucial to 
remember that children's habitual preference formation is known to their parents, but not to the 
children themselves.  
Our solution to problem (ii) may be more important, and will reveal whether the parent's 
income transfer to a child will induce gratitude in the child, to him as his parent is sufficiently 
rich and altruistic or not. This is because reducing a marginal unit of income transfer to a child 
has two countervailing effects. First, it directly reduces the child's felicity throughout the period. 
Second, it weakens the child's consumption habit in the following period, and mitigates excess 
consumption that comes from the child being unaware of his or her habit formation. The 
parental behavior of keeping income transfer low enhances the child's welfare only when the 
second positive effect dominates the first negative effect. Note, however, that unless parental 
income, as well as the degree of parental altruism are large enough—and hence, unless the 
income transfer level is large enough—the marginal utility of income transfer is necessarily so 
high that the first negative effect dominates the second positive effect.   
As a casual observation, some rich parents indulge their children by giving them too much, 
while some poor parents strictly discipline their children by controlling their 
consumption/saving behavior. Depending on our results regarding the thankworthiness of 
parents’ altruistic interventions, the difference could be attributable to whether the parents 
themselves experienced thankworthy transfers or not. Even when a mother is, at present, poor, 
she could be strict about her children's profligacy if she comes from a rich family and 
appreciates her own parents’ strict rearing. In contrast, a rich mother may spoil her son if she is 
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from a poor family, and does not appreciate her own strict childhood.  
We also show that when the child's habit parameter exogenously shifts upward, the altruistic 
parent necessarily reduces the unexpectedly low income transfer further, so as to mitigate the 
child’s over-consumption. The result is comparable with parents' "tough love" behavior that 
Ogaki and Bhatt (2012) derive by specifying an endogenous time-discounting function. They 
show that an altruistic parent reduces income transfer in response to an exogenous rise in the 
child's time preference. Since an increase in the habit parameter is shown to raise the child's 
time preference induced by the consumption habit, our comparative static result may be 
considered a version of the tough love result. However, there are two key differences. First, in 
the present model, time preference is endogenously generated by habit formation, rather than by 
an exogenously given time preference formation. Second and more importantly, our tough love 
is thankworthy to the child if his parent is sufficiently altruistic and rich. This contrasts with the 
Ogaki and Bhatt model, wherein a mother's tough love necessarily reduces her son's welfare, 
because the mother evaluates her son's future utility by using a different time preference from 
that of the child.
2
 
Our study is also related to that of Weinberg (2001). By using a static principal-agency model 
of the child-parent interaction, he explains the positive relationship between parental income 
and frequency of using pecuniary punishment, rather than corporal punishment. Unlike his 
                                            
2 Ogaki and Bhatt (2012) also examine an "endogenous altruism model," in which the parent evaluates 
the child’s future utility by using the same time discounting function that the child uses. In this case, the 
income transfer that the altruistic parent chooses necessarily equals what the child expects to receive. 
Therefore, even when the parent reduces income transfer due to a shock, it is not “tough” but always 
reasonable, even to the young child. This contrasts with our case, in which a reduction in the parent's 
income transfer after a shock always seems harmful, and hence tough, to the child at that time, because he 
is then unaware of the habit effect. It is, therefore, only reasonable and thankworthy to the child after 
reaching adulthood. 
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model with parent-child information asymmetry, however, our dynamic model supposes 
cross-generation asymmetry in cognitive power to identify future habit effects. We emphasize 
parental cognitive power that corrects children's habitual over-consumption.
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The results of this model jointly imply that it is important for the parents to control children’s 
impulses and habitual consumption, because it is beneficial to children’s academic, economic, 
and health outcomes in the long run. A series of empirical studies support this conclusion (see, 
for example, Shoda, Mischel and Peake, 1990; Heckman, 2006; Chabris et al., 2008; and 
Moffitt et al., 2011). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 
3 describes the expected transfer by the child. Section 4 compares the parental income transfers 
and the child’s welfare. Section 5 discusses the endogenous time preference and tough love. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. The Model 
Consider a family consisting of a parent and a child, both of whom live for three periods. The 
parent (a mother) gives birth to a child (a son) in her second period, which therefore overlaps 
with the child’s first period. 
The Child’s Problem 
In the child’s first period, he receives transfer 𝑇 from the parent. In the second period, the 
                                            
3 Despite the differences, our result—suggesting that income transfers of richer parents are likely to be 
thankworthy to children—seems consistent with the positive relationship that Weinberg (2001) reports 
between parental income and the frequency of using pecuniary punishment. 
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child receives an exogenous income 𝑦2 .
4
 Variables 𝑐𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2,3)  denote the child’s 
consumption in period 𝑖. The child is assumed to face borrowing constraints in period 1: 
𝑐1 ≤ 𝑇. We assume that his disposable income 𝑇 is small enough that the borrowing constraint 
is binding: 
𝑐1 = 𝑇,                              (1) 
His intertemporal budget in periods 2 and 3 is given by 
𝑐3 = 𝑅(𝑦2 − 𝑐2).                            (2) 
where 𝑅 is the gross interest rate. 
The child forms consumption habits. His preferences are given by 
𝑈 = 𝑢(𝑐1) + 𝛽𝑢(𝑐2 − 𝜃1ℎ2) + 𝛽
2𝑢(𝑐3 − 𝜃2ℎ3),               (3) 
where  ℎ2 = 𝑐1 and ℎ3 = 𝑐2, 
which captures the habit effects of consumption in the previous period. Parameters 𝜃1, 𝜃2 > 0 
represent the strength of habit formation, and 𝛽 > 0 denotes the discount factor.  
Equation (3) implies that while the existence of habit formation raises the marginal utility of 
consumption, it also reduces the levels of period utilities. However, the child does not realize 
until his third period that his consumption in his first and second periods was habit-forming: 
Assumption 1. The child is unaware of his habit in his first and second periods. In his third 
period, he becomes aware of the habit. 
                                            
4 We assume away the first-period income 𝑦1 to the child. This, however, does not affect our main 
results below. 
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Under Assumption 1, the child's consumption behavior is assumed to proceed as follows. In 
the first period, the child naively maximizes his lifetime utility 
  𝑢(𝑐1) + 𝛽𝑢(𝑐2) + 𝛽
2𝑢(𝑐3).                         (4) 
In the second period, the child notices that the utility is actually different from what was 
expected in the previous period. However, instead of realizing the true mechanism of habit 
formation, he incorrectly understands it to be caused by a permanent preference shock
5
 and 
maximizes the utility 
 𝑢(𝑐2 − 𝜃1𝑐1
∗) + 𝛽𝑢(𝑐3 − 𝜃1𝑐1
∗),                         (5) 
where 𝑐1
∗ denotes the child’s actual consumption level in the first period. In his third (the last) 
period, the child becomes aware of his true preferences with habit formation as in (3).  
The Parent’s Problem 
Since the parent can affect the child’s consumption—and, thereby, welfare—though income 
transfer 𝑇, we focus on her decision in her second period. In the second period, she receives 
endowment income 𝑦𝑝, and maximizes the sum of the second and third period utilities by 
choosing consumption basket (𝑐2,𝑝, 𝑐3,𝑝) and transfer 𝑇 to the child. Her budget constraint is 
given by 
𝑐3,𝑝 = 𝑅(𝑦𝑝 − 𝑐2,𝑝 − 𝑇).                          (6) 
Assumption 2. The parent knows that her child is unaware of his own habit formation until his 
last period. 
                                            
5 For the case where the misperception disappears, see Appendix A4. 
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The parent is altruistic toward her child. We specify her utility function as a convex sum of 
the felicity from her own consumption (𝑢(𝑐2,𝑝) + 𝛽𝑢(𝑐3,𝑝)) and her child’s true utility (𝑈): 
𝑉 = (1 − 𝛾)[𝑢(𝑐2,𝑝) + 𝛽𝑢(𝑐3,𝑝)] + 𝛾𝑈, 
6
                  (7) 
where 𝛾 ∈ [0,1] denotes the degree of parental altruism. 
She is aware that her child, who is ignorant of the effect of habit formation, will consume too 
much in his first and second periods. The altruistic parent therefore has an incentive to keep her 
child’s consumption level lower by restricting the amount of income transfer. 
In order to obtain closed-form solutions, we specify the period utility function as follows: 
Assumption 3. 𝑢(𝑥) =
𝑥1−𝛼
1−𝛼
 (𝛼 > 0).                                            
We guarantee that the arguments of the utility functions are positive by assuming the 
following: 
Assumption 4. When θ2 < 1, (𝛽𝑅)
−1 𝛼⁄ < 1, 𝑦𝑝 <
𝑅𝑦2
𝜃1(1+𝑅)
; 
             when θ2 ≥ 1, (𝛽𝑅)
−1 𝛼⁄ <
1
𝜃2
, 𝑦𝑝 <
[1−𝜃2(𝛽𝑅)
−1 𝛼⁄ ]𝑅𝑦2
𝜃1(𝜃2+𝑅)[1−(𝛽𝑅)
−1 𝛼⁄ ]
.
7
  
Intuitively, the above assumption ensures that the child’s consumption in the second and third 
periods is sufficiently low compared to its value in the previous period. This is achieved by 
                                            
6 Without loss of generality, we assume that the parent’s period utility function is the same as the child’s. 
7 When the child gets the first-period income 𝑦1, the corresponding assumption to Assumption 4 should 
be as follows: when θ2 < 1 ,  (𝛽𝑅)
−1 𝛼⁄ < 1 , 𝑦𝑝 + 𝑦1 <
𝑅𝑦2
𝜃1(1+𝑅)
; when θ2 ≥ 1 ,  (𝛽𝑅)
−1 𝛼⁄ <
1
𝜃2
, 
𝑦𝑝 + 𝑦1 <
[1−𝜃2(𝛽𝑅)
−1 𝛼⁄ ]𝑅𝑦2
𝜃1(𝜃2+𝑅)[1−(𝛽𝑅)
−1 𝛼⁄ ]
. 
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restricting parameters, such that (i) the sum of the parent’s income and the child’s first-period 
income is sufficiently is lower than the child’s second-period income and (ii) the child’s 
discount factor is sufficiently high. 
To show the welfare implications of the altruistic transfer, we distinguish and compare two 
types of the income transfers to the child: (i) the actual transfer that the parent determines by 
maximizing her altruistic utility (i.e., (7)), and (ii) the income transfer that is expected by the 
child. Because the parent knows of the child's habit formation, but the child does not, the two 
transfers will differ. 
The parent understands her child’s habit-formation, and considers it when she determines the 
transfer to her child. In this context, the parent indirectly steers her child away from falling into 
unintended excessive consumption due this habit effect. The child, however, does not know of 
the parent's altruistic intervention.  
3. The Income Transfer Expected by the Child 
We consider how much income transfer the child expects to receive from his parent. The 
expected level of income transfer could be a reference point for us to evaluate the parent's 
intervention through income transfer: it enables us to (i) show that, consistent with daily 
observations, the parent's income transfer is unexpectedly small for her young child, and (ii) 
examine whether the unexpectedly small transfer is appreciable to the grown-up child. 
Consider the child’s consumption choice prior to receiving an income transfer from the parent 
in his first period. Because he does not foresee the transfer level perfectly, it is a sort of 
expected consumption choice based on his expectations regarding parental income transfer. The 
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obtained solutions for expected consumption, 𝑐𝑖
𝑒  ( 𝑖 = 1,2,3), will not be realized—first 
because the parent's income transfer differs from he expects, and second, because his 
preferences would shift due to the habit effect of the transfer in the first period.  
With an expected level of the parent's income transfer 𝑇𝑒 being given, the 𝑐𝑖
𝑒 are obtained 
by maximizing the child’s lifetime utility (4) subject to budget constraints (1) and (2). The 
optimality conditions are given by 
𝑐1
𝑒 = 𝑇𝑒,                                (8) 
𝑢′(𝑐2
𝑒) = 𝛽𝑅𝑢′(𝑐3
𝑒).                            (9) 
Equation (8) determines 𝑐1
𝑒. Budget constraints (1) and (2) and first-order condition (9) jointly 
determine 𝑐2
𝑒 and 𝑐3
𝑒. Note that 𝑐2
𝑒 and 𝑐3
𝑒 are independent of the expected parent’s transfer 
𝑇𝑒 (
𝜕𝑐2
𝑒
𝜕𝑇
= 0, 
𝜕𝑐3
𝑒
𝜕𝑇
= 0), because the child does not incorporate the habit effect from Assumption 
1. 
Given that the expected consumption behavior 𝑐𝑖
𝑒  is conditional on parental income transfer,   
the child, in turn, computes expected income transfer 𝑇𝑒  by anticipating his parent's 
utility-maximizing behavior. When anticipating the parent’s behavior, however, he does not 
incorporate his own habit from Assumption 1. From the anticipated utility-maximizing behavior 
of the parent, the expected transfer 𝑇𝑒  is determined jointly with expected parent’s 
consumption (𝑐2,𝑝
𝑒 , 𝑐3,𝑝
𝑒 ) by the budget constraint 
𝑐3,𝑝
𝑒 = 𝑅(𝑦𝑝 − 𝑐2,𝑝
𝑒 − 𝑇𝑒) 
and the first-order conditions 
(1 − 𝛾)[𝑢′(𝑐2,𝑝
𝑒 ) − 𝛽𝑅𝑢′(𝑐3,𝑝
𝑒 )] = 0,                    (10) 
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𝛽𝑅(1 − 𝛾)𝑢′(𝑐3,𝑝
𝑒 ) = 𝛾𝑢′(𝑇𝑒),                      (11) 
where we set 
𝜕𝑐2
𝑒
𝜕𝑇
= 0 and 
𝜕𝑐3
𝑒
𝜕𝑇
= 0 in (11) from Assumption 1.  
4. The Altruistic Intervention of the Parent 
4.1. The Actual Transfer Decided by the Parent 
The parent behaves differently from the child’s expectations because she knows that her 
child’s preferences will shift due to the effect of habit formation, even though the child himself 
does not recognize it in his early periods. Hence, when deciding an income transfer level for her 
young son, the mother takes into account the habit effect that the transfer will have on his 
consumption in his second and third periods. Formally, the parent chooses the transfer level to 
her child by maximizing her altruistic utility (7), which incorporates the child’s true utility 
function (3). We denote the actual income transfer level that the parent decides optimally by 𝑇∗. 
In the child’s second period, he takes the habit as a permanent preference shock. Maximizing 
(5) leads to the first-order condition of the child in the second period: 
𝑢′[𝑐2 − 𝜃1𝑐1
∗] = 𝛽𝑅𝑢′[𝑐3 − 𝜃1𝑐1
∗],                     (12) 
where the first-period consumption is given by the borrowing constraint 
            𝑐1
∗ = 𝑇∗.                               (13) 
Under budget constraints (13) and  
𝑐3
∗ = 𝑅(𝑦2 − 𝑐2
∗), 
12 
 
the actual consumption levels 𝑐2
∗ and 𝑐3
∗ are determined by (12). Because the first-period 
consumption 𝑐1
∗ depends on the income transfer level from (13), the actual consumption levels 
𝑐2
∗ and 𝑐3
∗ are functions of the income transfer 𝑇 from (12).  
With the function 𝑐2
∗  and 𝑐3
∗ being given, the parent chooses (𝑐2,𝑝, 𝑐3,𝑝, 𝑇
∗ ) so as to 
maximize (7). The first-order conditions are 
(1 − 𝛾)[𝑢′(𝑐2,𝑝
∗ ) − 𝛽𝑅𝑢′(𝑐3,𝑝
∗ )] = 0,                 (14) 
𝛽𝑅(1 − 𝛾)𝑢′(𝑐3,𝑝
∗ ) = 𝛾[𝑢′(𝑇∗) + 𝛽𝑢′(𝑐2
∗ − 𝜃1𝑐1
∗) (
𝜕𝑐2
∗
𝜕𝑇∗
− 𝜃1
𝜕𝑐1
∗
𝜕𝑇∗
) 
      +𝛽2𝑢′(𝑐3
∗ − 𝜃2𝑐2
∗) (
𝜕𝑐3
∗
𝜕𝑇∗
− 𝜃2
𝜕𝑐2
∗
𝜕𝑇∗
). 
(15) 
First-order conditions (14) and (15) and budget constraint (6) jointly determine the parental 
income transfer level. We denote it by 𝑇∗(𝛼, 𝛾, 𝛽, 𝑅, 𝑦𝑝, 𝜃1, 𝜃2, 𝑦2).  
In the following subsections, we characterize the income transfer 𝑇∗ of the altruistic parent 
by comparing it with the young child's expectation on income transfer 𝑇𝑒. By substituting 
functions 𝑐𝑖
∗(𝑇) into (3), we obtain the child's indirect utility as a function of income transfer T, 
 𝑈(𝑇). Notice that there exists a maximum of 𝑈(𝑇) . We denote the transfer level that 
maximizes the child’s utility by ?̅?. By definition, it satisfies 𝑈′(?̅?) = 0. Using Assumption 3, 
we express ?̅? as ?̅?(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑅, 𝜃1, 𝜃2, 𝑦2). 
Since the child’s utility is maximized at the point of ?̅?, too much income transfer (more than 
?̅?) harms him. Note that the parent necessarily chooses income transfer level 𝑇∗ such that it is 
13 
 
smaller than ?̅?: 𝑇∗ < ?̅?. This choice is made because if 𝑇∗ were higher than ?̅?, the parent 
could enhance both her own welfare and the child's welfare by reducing the income transfer. 
However, the expected transfer 𝑇𝑒 can be either smaller or larger than ?̅?, depending on the 
parent’s income level 𝑦𝑝. To compare the actual and expected transfers (𝑇
∗ and 𝑇𝑒) and the 
corresponding welfare levels, it would, therefore, be helpful to separate two cases: (i) 𝑦𝑝 > ?̅? 
and (ii) 𝑦𝑝 ≤ ?̅?, which represent the rich-parent and poor-parent cases, respectively.  
4.2. Comparison of Actual and Expected Transfers 
The parent is aware of her child’s habit formation and incorporates it in her decision making, 
while the child does not. Thus, the actual transfer 𝑇∗ deviates from the expected one 𝑇𝑒. 
Proposition 1 states the relationship between 𝑇∗ and 𝑇𝑒. 
Proposition 1. For any degree of parental altruism 𝛾 ∈ (0,1), the parental income transfer is 
unexpectedly small to the young child, that is, 𝑇∗ < 𝑇𝑒. 
Proof. See Appendix A1. 
Proposition 1 implies that, insofar as the parent is not perfectly selfish or perfectly altruistic, 
she keeps the transfer level to her child lower than he expects. The parent knows that more 
transfer leads the child to form deeper habits, and hence consume more excessively in the next 
period. Hence, she intervenes in the child’s behavior by keeping the transfer low. 
Note that when the parent is perfectly selfish (𝛾 = 0) or perfectly altruistic (𝛾 = 1), 𝑇∗ can 
equal 𝑇𝑒 . In particular, when 𝛾 = 0 , we have trivially 𝑇∗ = 𝑇𝑒 = 0  (i.e., purely selfish 
parents do not give, and are not expected to give, transfers to their children).  
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When 𝛾 = 1, we have 𝑇∗ = ?̅? if the parent is poor, 𝑦𝑝 ≤ ?̅?. Since the poor parent cannot 
afford to transfer ?̅?, she just gives her whole income to her child, as he expects. In the poor 
parent case, therefore, we have 𝑇∗ = 𝑇𝑒 = 𝑦𝑝. When the parent is rich, 𝑦𝑝 > ?̅?; however, the 
parental transfer 𝑇∗  is smaller than what the child expects and again, 𝑇∗ < 𝑇𝑒 . This is 
because 𝑇∗ maximizes the child’s utility, 𝑇∗ = ?̅?, whereas the naïve child expects the purely 
altruistic parent to transfer her whole income to him, 𝑇𝑒 = 𝑦𝑝(> ?̅? by constuction).  
4.3. The Welfare of the Child 
As shown in the previous section, the parental income transfer is unexpectedly small in the 
eyes of the young child. Our interest here is to evaluate it from the viewpoint of the child's 
welfare; we shall show that the unexpectedly small transfer could make the child better off.  
We compare utility values of actual transfer 𝑇∗ (𝑈(𝑇∗)) and expected transfer 𝑇𝑒 (𝑈(𝑇𝑒)) 
by employing the true utility function (3). Because the child is incognizant of the true utility 
function 𝑈(∙) until his third period, the utility function 𝑈(∙) can be regarded as a retrospective 
welfare measure of income transfer T.
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Of particular interest is whether the parental income transfer generates higher welfare of the 
child than the child’s expected transfer does, when evaluated by the retrospective measure. If it 
does, the grown-up child is thankful to his parent for receiving the unexpectedly small transfer. 
Hence, we include the following definition. 
Definition 1. When 𝑈(𝑇∗) > 𝑈(𝑇𝑒) , parental income transfer 𝑇∗  is referred to as 
thankworthy to the child. 
                                            
8 Pollack (1978) recommends "unconditional welfare ordering", which incorporates the effects of 
endogenous preference formation—we used the same welfare criterion here. 
15 
 
We first consider the case of a poor parent, where 𝑦𝑝 ≤ ?̅? (Figures 1 and 2). In this case, the 
parent cannot provide the child with a transfer exceeding ?̅?. As Figure 1 shows, both 𝑇∗ and 
𝑇𝑒 are less than 𝑦𝑝, and hence are less than ?̅?. Recall from Proposition 1 that 𝑇
∗ < 𝑇𝑒 for 
𝛾 ∈ (0,1). Since the child’s welfare increases with transfers in the region of T < ?̅?, we have 
𝑈(𝑇∗) < 𝑈(𝑇𝑒) for 𝛾 ∈ (0,1) (i.e., the parental income transfer is not thankworthy to the 
child).
9
  
   
<Figure 1> & <Figure 2> 
 
When the parent is rich, 𝑦𝑝 > ?̅?, the child’s welfare first increases and then decreases with 
the income transfer level. As Figure 3 shows, the rich parent can provide the child with more 
transfer than ?̅?, but she maintains transfer level 𝑇∗ lower than this. However, the expected 
transfer 𝑇𝑒 can be more than ?̅?. Too much transfer (more than ?̅?) causes the child’s welfare 
𝑈 to decrease. Therefore, the retrospective utility of the expected transfer 𝑈(𝑇𝑒) can be lower 
than that of actual transfer 𝑈(𝑇∗). 
Recall that when 𝛾 = 0, 𝑇∗ = 𝑇𝑒 = 0, and that when 𝛾 = 1, 𝑇∗ = ?̅?, which is an interior 
solution, and 𝑇𝑒 = 𝑦𝑝, which is a corner solution (Figure 4). As 𝛾 increases from 0 to 1, the 
actual transfer 𝑇∗ increases from 0 to ?̅?, and the expected transfer 𝑇𝑒 increases from 0 to 𝑦𝑝. 
The parent has to balance between her own utility and the child’s utility. Under the condition of 
the rich parent, the child’s welfare increases with the actual transfer 𝑇∗, and therefore also 
                                            
9 When the parent is purely selfish (𝛾 = 0) or purely altruistic (𝛾 = 1), we have 𝑈(𝑇∗) = 𝑈(𝑇𝑒) 
(Figure 2).  
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increases with the degree of parental altruism 𝛾. However, the child’s retrospective utility level 
of 𝑇𝑒  decreases with 𝑇𝑒  when it exceeds ?̅?. Therefore, there exists a certain degree of 
parental altruism, which equalizes 𝑈(𝑇∗) and 𝑈(𝑇𝑒). 
Lemma 1. When the parent is rich, there exists a degree of parental altruism ?̃? ∈ (0,1) such 
that 𝑈(𝑇∗) = 𝑈(𝑇𝑒). 
Proof. See Appendix A2. 
For all degrees of parental altruism higher than ?̃?, the actual transfer leads to higher welfare 
of the child, and hence, the actual transfer is thankworthy for the child.  
 
<Figure 3> & <Figure 4> 
 
Proposition 2. When the parent is rich ( 𝑦𝑝 > ?̅? ), the parental income transfer 𝑇
∗  is 
thankworthy for the child, that is, 𝑈(𝑇∗) > 𝑈(𝑇𝑒), if the parent is so altruistic that 𝛾 > ?̃?.  
Proof. See Appendix A2. 
Reducing parental income transfer (i) directly lowers the child’s utility in each period and (ii) 
weakens the child’s consumption habit. When the parent’s income and the degree of parental 
altruism are large enough, and hence the income transfer is large enough, the second negative 
effect dominates the first positive one. Therefore, the unexpectedly low transfer makes the child 
better off. In this context, in his third period, the child becomes aware of the habit and thanks 
the parent for having given him less transfer than he expected. 
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5. An Increase in the Habit Parameter 
As shown in Proposition 1, the altruistic parent keeps income transfer to the child lower than 
what the child expects to receive. When the child’s consumption habit and his consumption 
propensity are exogenously enhanced, the parent would further reduce the income transfer so as 
to mitigate the resulting increase in the child’s over-consumption. 
We can show the validity of this conjecture by examining the effect of an exogenous increase 
in the child’s habit parameter in his second period 𝜃1.  
Proposition 3.  A higher degree 𝜃1 of the child’s habit in the second period implies a lower 
level of parental income transfer 𝑇∗, that is, 
𝑑𝑇∗
𝑑𝜃1
< 0.   
Proof. See Appendix A3. 
Proposition 3 shows that the parent penalizes the child for an increase in habitual 
consumption by reducing income transfer. This strict behavior, however, comes from the 
parent's altruistic motive. 
Note that the apparently strict yet altruistic behavior of the parent is similar to the parents' 
“tough love” behavior that Bhatt and Ogaki (2012) derived. By assuming an endogenous time 
discounting function, they show that, in response to an exogenous rise in a child's future time 
preference, his altruistic parent reduces income transfer so as to mitigate the increase in his 
degree of impatience. Our result in Proposition 3 is comparable to this tough love result, 
because an increase in the habit parameter would raise the child's time preference.  
Formally, following the literature on time preference (e.g., Obstfeld, 1990), we define the 
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child’s pure subjective rate of time preference in his second period as follows: 
𝜒2,3(𝑐) = log 𝑀𝑅𝑆(𝑐2, 𝑐3) |𝑐2=𝑐3=𝑐 
= 𝜌 + log [
𝑢′(𝑐 − 𝜃1ℎ2)
𝑢′(𝑐 − 𝜃2ℎ3)
−
𝜃2
1 + 𝜌
], 
(16) 
where 𝜌 = 1 𝛽⁄ − 1 is the subjective discount rate of the child. It is then is easy to see that 
when degree of the habit formation in the child’s second period 𝜃1 exogenously increases, the 
child’s time preference function 𝜒2,3(𝑐) shifts upward. Because the parent reduces income 
transfer 𝑇∗ (see Proposition 3) upon the increase in 𝜃1, the parent's behavior above seems to 
duplicate the tough love behavior discussed by Bhatt and Ogaki (2012). 
Our discussion is distinct in two aspects. First, in the present model, time preference is 
endogenously generated by habit formation rather than by an exogenously given time 
preference formation. Second and more importantly, our tough love is thankworthy to the child 
if his parent is altruistic and rich enough. This contrasts with the case explored in the Ogaki and 
Bhatt model, wherein a mother's tough love necessarily reduces her son's welfare, because the 
mother evaluates her son's future utility by using different time preference than that of the child. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
By employing a parental altruism model where the child is ignorant of his own habit until he 
reaches adulthood, we show that the parental income transfer seems unexpectedly low to the 
young child. However, the unexpectedly low parental income transfer can generate higher 
welfare for the child than the expected transfer, when evaluated retrospectively. In other words, 
when the parent is rich and sufficiently altruistic, the parent’s income transfer is thankworthy to 
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the grown-up child. The predictions of this model are consistent with daily observations. 
This research may have important implications for understanding how parent-child 
interactions affect the consumption/saving behavior and related preference formation of family 
members. For example, our result is consistent with the observation that richer parents, or 
parents from richer families, tend to be stricter than poorer parents (or those from poorer 
families) when safeguarding against their children’s profligacy. 
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Appendix 
A1. Proof of Proposition 1 
When ∀𝛾 ∈ (0,1), we compare the actual transfer 𝑇∗ with the expected transfer 𝑇𝑒 by 
dividing the first order condition (11) with the first order condition (15). By substituting 
first-order conditions (9) and (14) as well as Assumption 1 we have 
(
𝑦𝑝 − 𝑇
∗
𝑦𝑝 − 𝑇𝑒
)−𝛼 = (
𝑇∗
𝑇𝑒
)−𝛼 
−
𝛽𝜃1(𝑅 + 1)(𝛽𝑅)
−1
𝛼[𝑅𝑦2(𝛽𝑅)
−1
𝛼 − 𝜃1(𝑅 + 1)(𝛽𝑅)
−1
𝛼(𝑇∗)]−𝛼
[1 + 𝑅(𝛽𝑅)−
1
𝛼]1−𝛼(𝑇𝑒)−𝛼
 
−
𝛽2𝜃2(𝜃2 + 𝑅) [1 − (𝛽𝑅)
−1
𝛼] [𝑅𝑦2(1 − 𝜃2(𝛽𝑅)
−1
𝛼) − 𝜃1(𝜃2 + 𝑅)(1 − (𝛽𝑅)
−1
𝛼)(𝑇∗)]
−𝛼
[1 + 𝑅(𝛽𝑅)−
1
𝛼]1−𝛼(𝑇𝑒)−𝛼
. 
(A1) 
Equation (A1) implies that 
𝑇∗
𝑇𝑒
< 1. Therefore, we have ∀𝛾 ∈ (0,1), 𝑇∗ < 𝑇𝑒. 
A2. Proof of Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 
The child’s utility 𝑈 is continuous in the degree of parental altruism 𝛾. When 𝑇 < ?̅?, 𝑈 is 
increasing in 𝑇; and when 𝑇 > ?̅?, 𝑈 is decreasing in 𝑇. The income transfers 𝑇∗ and 𝑇𝑒 
are both continuous and increasing in 𝛾. 
When 𝑦𝑝 > ?̅?, we obtain lim𝛾→1 𝑇
∗ = ?̅?, which is an interior solution and that lim𝛾→1 𝑇
𝑒 =
𝑦𝑝, which is a corner solution. We also have lim𝛾→1 𝑈′(𝑇
∗) = 0 and lim𝛾→1 𝑈′(𝑇
𝑒) < 0. 
Hence, in the neighborhood of 𝛾 = 1, 𝑈(𝑇∗) > 𝑈(𝑇𝑒). 
When 𝛾 decreases from 1, both 𝑇∗ and 𝑇𝑒 decrease, as does 𝑈(𝑇∗). However, 𝑈(𝑇𝑒) 
increases until 𝑇𝑒 equals to ?̅?. Hence, there exists a certain ?̃? such that 𝑈(𝑇∗) = 𝑈(𝑇𝑒). 
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When 𝛾 > ?̃?, we have 𝑈(𝑇∗) > 𝑈(𝑇𝑒). 
A3. Proof of Proposition 3 
First-conditions (10) and (11) and budget constraint (4) jointly determine the optimal transfer 
of the parent 𝑇∗(𝛼, 𝛾, 𝛽, 𝑅, 𝑦𝑝, 𝜃1, 𝜃2, 𝑦1, 𝑦2). 
Substituting first-order condition (10) into (11) and taking the total derivative of the optimal 
transfer by the parent 𝑇∗ with respect to the habit parameter 𝜃1 leads to  
{
(1 − 𝛾)𝛼𝛽𝑅1−𝛼(𝑦𝑝 − 𝑇
∗)
−𝛼−1
𝛾 [1 + 𝑅(𝛽𝑅)−
1
𝛼]
−𝛼 + 𝛼(𝑇
∗)−𝛼−1 
+
𝛼𝛽(𝛽𝑅)−
1
𝛼𝜃1(1 + 𝑅)[𝑅𝑦2(𝛽𝑅)
−1
𝛼 − 𝜃1(1 + 𝑅)(𝛽𝑅)
−1
𝛼(𝑇∗)]−𝛼−1
[1 + 𝑅(𝛽𝑅)−
1
𝛼]1−𝛼
 
 
+
𝛼𝛽2𝜃1𝜃2(𝜃2 + 𝑅)
2[1 − (𝛽𝑅)−
1
𝛼]2[𝑅𝑦2 (1 − 𝜃2(𝛽𝑅)
−1
𝛼) − 𝜃1(𝜃2 + 𝑅)(1 − (𝛽𝑅)
−1
𝛼)(𝑇∗)]−𝛼−1
[1 + 𝑅(𝛽𝑅)−
1
𝛼]1−𝛼
}
𝑑𝑇∗
𝑑𝜃1
 
= −
𝛽(𝛽𝑅)−
1
𝛼(1 + 𝑅)[𝑅𝑦2(𝛽𝑅)
−1
𝛼 − 𝜃1(1 + 𝑅)(𝛽𝑅)
−1
𝛼(𝑇∗)]−𝛼−1
[1 + 𝑅(𝛽𝑅)−
1
𝛼]1−𝛼
 
∙ {[𝑅𝑦2(𝛽𝑅)
−1
𝛼 − 𝜃1(1 + 𝑅)(𝛽𝑅)
−1
𝛼(𝑇∗)] + (1 + 𝑅)(𝛽𝑅)−
1
𝛼(𝑇∗)} 
−
𝛼𝛽2𝜃2(𝜃2 + 𝑅)
2[1 − (𝛽𝑅)−
1
𝛼]2[𝑅𝑦2 (1 − 𝜃2(𝛽𝑅)
−1
𝛼) − 𝜃1(𝜃2 + 𝑅)(1 − (𝛽𝑅)
−1
𝛼)(𝑇∗)]−𝛼−1
[1 + 𝑅(𝛽𝑅)−
1
𝛼]1−𝛼
 
∙ (𝜃2 + 𝑅)(𝑇
∗), 
(A2) 
where, from Assumption 4, the coefficient of 
𝑑𝑇∗
𝑑𝜃1
 is positive; and the right hand side is negative. 
Therefore, we have ∀𝛾(0,1), 
𝑑𝑇∗
𝑑𝜃1
< 0. 
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A4. When Misperception Disappears in the Child’s Second Period 
Here, we show that our main results are robust even when the child is assumed to become 
aware of his own habit formation in the second period, rather than in the third period.  
In order to guarantee that the arguments of the utility functions are positive, we assume, the 
following, instead of Assumption 1: 
Assumption A1. 𝑦𝑝 <
𝑅𝑦2
𝜃1(𝑅+𝜃2)
. 
We denote optimal solutions in the present case by using an apostrophe, instead of an asterisk 
in the text. 
In the second period, the misperception of the child disappears and the child maximizes the 
utility 𝑢(𝑐2 − 𝜃1𝑐1
′ ) + 𝛽𝑢(𝑐3 − 𝜃2𝑐2 ). The first-order condition is given by 
𝑢′[𝑐2 − 𝜃1𝑐1
′ ] = 𝛽(𝑅 + 𝜃2)𝑢
′[𝑐3 − 𝜃2𝑐2 ].               (A3) 
With 𝑐1
′  being given by the parent's income transfer 𝑇′, (A3) and budget constraint (3) jointly 
determine the consumption levels 𝑐2
′  and 𝑐3
′ . 
The parent’s first-order conditions of the parent are 
(1 − 𝛾)[𝑢′(𝑐2,𝑝
′ ) − 𝛽𝑅𝑢′(𝑐3,𝑝
′ )] = 0,                 (A4) 
𝛽𝑅(1 − 𝛾)𝑢′(𝑐3,𝑝
′ ) = 𝛾[𝑢′(𝑇′) + 𝛽𝑢′(𝑐2
′ − 𝜃1𝑐1
′ ) (
𝜕𝑐2
′
𝜕𝑇′
− 𝜃1
𝜕𝑐1
′
𝜕𝑇′
) 
      +𝛽2𝑢′(𝑐3
′ − 𝜃2𝑐2
′ ) (
𝜕𝑐3
′
𝜕𝑇′
− 𝜃2
𝜕′
𝜕𝑇′
). 
(A5) 
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First-order conditions (A4) and (A5) and budget constraint (6) jointly determine the parental 
income transfer 𝑇′. By noting that the expected transfer 𝑇𝑒 is the same as in the text, we 
obtain the following result: 
Proposition A1. For any degree of parental altruism 𝛾 ∈ (0,1), the parental income transfer is 
unexpectedly small to the young child, that is, 𝑇′ < 𝑇𝑒. 
Proof. 
  By substituting (9) into (10), (A4) into (.5), and dividing (A5) with (10), we have 
(
𝑦𝑝 − 𝑇
′
𝑦𝑝 − 𝑇𝑒
)−𝛼 = (
𝑇′
𝑇𝑒
)−𝛼 
−
𝛽2𝜃1(𝑅 + 𝜃2)[𝑅𝑦2 − 𝜃1(𝑅 + 𝜃2)(𝑇
′)]−𝛼
{1 + (𝑅 + 𝜃2)[𝛽(𝑅 + 𝜃2)]
−1
𝛼}
−𝛼
(𝑇𝑒)−𝛼
 
 (A6) 
Equation (A6) implies that 
𝑇′
𝑇𝑒
< 1. Therefore, we have ∀𝛾 ∈ (0,1), 𝑇′ < 𝑇𝑒. 
We can also show that there is a critical degree of parental altruism 𝛾 ∈ (0,1), such that 
𝑈(𝑇′) = 𝑈(𝑇𝑒). As in Proposition 2, we have: 
Proposition A2. When the parent is rich (𝑦𝑝 > ?̅? ), the parental income transfer 𝑇
′  is 
thankworthy for the child, that is, 𝑈(𝑇′) > 𝑈(𝑇𝑒), if the parent is so altruistic that 𝛾 > 𝛾.  
Proof. 
The child’s utility 𝑈 is continuous in the degree of parental altruism 𝛾. When 𝑇 < ?̅?, 𝑈 is 
increasing in 𝑇; and when 𝑇 > ?̅?, 𝑈 is decreasing in 𝑇. The income transfers 𝑇′ and 𝑇𝑒 are 
both continuous and increasing in 𝛾. 
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When 𝑦𝑝 > ?̅?, we obtain lim𝛾→1 𝑇
′ = ?̅?, which is an interior solution and that lim𝛾→1 𝑇
𝑒 =
𝑦𝑝, which is a corner solution. We also have lim𝛾→1 𝑈′(𝑇
′) = 0 and lim𝛾→1 𝑈′(𝑇
𝑒) < 0. 
Hence, in the neighborhood of 𝛾 = 1, 𝑈(𝑇′) > 𝑈(𝑇𝑒). 
When 𝛾 decreases from 1, both 𝑇′ and 𝑇𝑒 decrease, and 𝑈(𝑇′) also decreases. However, 
𝑈(𝑇𝑒) increases until 𝑇𝑒 equals to ?̅?. Hence there exists a certain ?̃? such that 𝑈(𝑇′) =
𝑈(𝑇𝑒). When 𝛾 > ?̃?, we have 𝑈(𝑇′) > 𝑈(𝑇𝑒). 
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Figure 1.  The utility of the child as a function of 𝑇 when the parent is poor  
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Figure 2.  The utility of the child as a function of 𝛾 when the parent is poor  
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Figure 3.  The utility of the child as a function of 𝑇 when the parent is rich 
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Figure 4.  The utility of the child as a function of 𝛾 when the parent is rich 
 
